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  INTERMEDIA SUBSTITUTABILITY AND MARKET DEMAND 
                            BY NATIONAL ADVERTISERS 
 
                                     Alvin J. Silk, Lisa R. Klein, and Ernst R. Berndt 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The U.S. advertising market can be decomposed into two segments, based on the 
geographical scope of advertisers’ operations. National advertisers consisting of 
firms that market their products and services on a national or broad regional basis 
constitute the largest segment, accounting for about 58% of total U.S. advertising 
expenditures in the 1990’s.1 National advertisers employ a variety of media, 
including direct mail, magazines, newspapers, outdoor, radio (network and spot), 
and television (network and spot). Local advertisers, accounting for the other 48% of 
total U.S. advertising outlays, are primarily retailers that serve geographically 
limited markets. Local advertisers also utilize many classes of media but certain 
media used by national advertisers, such as network radio and network television, 
are not suitable for local advertisers because the market areas the latter serve 
constitute only a fraction of the total nationwide audience reached by those mass 
media. 
In this paper we examine national advertisers’ aggregate demand for different 
types of media.  We address two questions: (1) To what extent do the major categories 
of mass media substitute for or complement one another as modes of advertising 
communication; and (2) How price-sensitive is national advertisers’ aggregate demand 
for each of the major categories of mass media? The two questions are, of course, related 
since we know from economic theory that for any input, the sum of its own-price 
elasticity plus all its cross-price elasticities with respect to other inputs is zero (cf., 
Henderson and Quandt 1980).     
                                                 
1 On the distinction between national and local advertisers, see Owen and Wildman (1992, pp. 12-14)  
  4
A priori, it is unclear whether any particular pair of media employed by national 
advertisers are substitutes or complements. While substitutability is certainly plausible, 
complementary relations may be expected as well since advertisers often use more than 
one class of media in a given campaign. Indeed, integrated use of different media, in 
order to exploit interactions among them (Rossiter and Danaher 1998), is often 
considered as the hallmark of effective planning of marketing communications 
campaigns (Schultz, Tannenbaum, and Lauterborn 1993). 
Intermedia substitutability is also an implicit consideration in the formulation of 
regulatory policies involving advertising.  To prohibit tobacco and liquor advertising on 
radio and television, but not in print (cf., Duffy 1996), would appear, for example, to 
presume weak intermedia substitutability or complementarity. Restrictions on cross 
ownership of broadcasting and newspaper establishments in the same geographic 
market were historically rationalized on grounds of extensive intermedia 
substitutability (Picard 1989), although recently the Federal Communications 
Commission announced that a review of these policies would be undertaken (Dreazen 
2001). Finally, the evolution of the World Wide Web as an advertising medium raises 
questions about its potential as a substitute or complement for existing media (Bank 
1996; Silk, Klein, and Berndt 2001).    
While measurement of the price elasticity of market demand for advertising in 
different media and intermedia substitutability/complementarity are clearly important, 
to date empirical both of these matters in general is relatively sparse. Moreover, as will 
be shown below, the handful of existing studies have produced some seemingly 
inconsistent conclusions. Upon closer scrutiny, it becomes apparent that a variety of 
approaches have been taken with respect to aggregating data across different types of 
advertisers (national vs. local) and various classes of media in different ways, thereby 
undermining the comparability of the results.    
Here we build on this literature in several ways. First, we focus only on national 
advertisers, since there is evidence that local and national advertising markets exhibit 
quite different sensitivities to cyclical and secular forces (Blank 1962; Schmalensee 1972;  5
and Yang 1964).2   Second, we disaggregate national advertisers’ expenditures into eight 
distinct media categories, and then test whether the aggregation of these categories into 
fewer, more global, media classes is supported by our data. Third, instead of a log-log 
demand model used in some earlier studies that imposes constant cross-price elasticities 
(Eklund, Ford, and Jackson 1999, 2000), following Seldon and Jung (1993) we utilize an 
extension of the translog functional form that allows cross-price elasticities to vary 
along with prices and expenditure shares. Our formulation also includes a number of 
non-price factors that affect national advertisers’ media shares. Finally, we employ 
annual data on national advertisers’ expenditures for the period 1960 through 1994. 
Terminating the time series at the latter date avoids the potential confounding effect of 
any disequilibria associated with the introduction of the Internet as an advertising 
medium in the mid-1990’s, as well as changes in the concentration of media suppliers 
following in the wake of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.  
The paper is organized as follows.  In Section II we advance two propositions 
bearing on the magnitudes of own-price and cross-price elasticities of market demands 
for media time and space by national advertisers. Section III presents our model 
specification and estimation methods.  Section IV discusses the data employed and 
estimation results, while Section V reports our estimates of own and cross-price 
elasticities for eight media categories.  In Section VI we relate our findings to industry 
media selection practices and institutional arrangements, discuss implications of 
market-level elasticity estimates for the demand elasticity faced by individual vehicles 
within a given media category, and then review factors that differentiate media 
substitutes and complements.  Section VII summarizes our principal findings and 
conclusions. 
 
                                                 
2 Several factors suggest differences between national and local advertisers with respect to price elasticity 
and intermedia substitutability of the market demands for media time and space. Whereas national 
advertisers generally undertake campaigns for brand-building purposes and assign media planning and 
buying to advertising agencies, local advertisers are more likely to focus on availability, price, and 
temporary promotions and often deal directly with media suppliers. Media offering flexible contractual 
terms, such as newspapers, represent a larger share of local than national advertising expenditures.  
  6
 
II. MARKET DEMAND BY NATIONAL ADVERTISERS FOR MEDIA SPACE AND 
    TIME 
We begin by considering theoretical arguments and empirical evidence that leads 
us to advance two propositions concerning the likely size of own and cross-price 
elasticities of national advertisers’ demand for media space and time. 
P1. Intermedia price substitutability and complementarity among the major 
classes of media employed by national advertisers will tend to be relatively 
weak. 
P2. Market demand by national advertisers for the major classes of media   will 
tend to be relatively price inelastic. 
From the perspective of the economics of information, national advertisers’ demand 
for media space and time is derived from consumers’ demand for information about the 
goods and services sold by national advertisers (Ehrlich and Fisher 1982; Nelson 1974).  
In Section II.1 we examine what the theory of derived demand implies about the price 
elasticity of market demand for media advertising and the empirical evidence bearing 
on the factors influencing it, including intermedia substitutability (P1). Against this 
background, in Section II.2 we review the available empirical evidence relating to the 
price sensitivity of demand for advertising in various media (P2). 
II.1  Derived Demand for Media Advertising 
The theoretical framework we employ is a very simple but elegant one governing 
the derived demand for factors of production, originally enunciated by Marshall (1922) 
as four “laws” of demand.3 Adapted to the present context, these laws imply that the 
derived demand by sellers of goods and services for advertising in a medium will be 
more price inelastic:  (i) the weaker is the substitutability with other media; (ii) the more 
inelastic is consumer demand for information about products and services; (iii) the 
more inelastic is the supply of other advertising media; and (iv) the smaller is the share 
                                                 
3 See Friedman (1976) and Stigler (1986) for further discussion of Marshall’s laws of demand.  7
of total costs accounted for expenditures on the advertising medium. Below we review 
the available evidence bearing on these four factors. 
II.1.A Intermedia Substitutability and Complementarity 
There are relatively few empirical studies examining national advertisers’ demand 
for media time and space and fewer still that have attempted estimate to own or cross-
price elasticities. Most of the available evidence has been motivated by regulatory 
concerns. Although early analyses of intermedia competition has frequently depicted 
network and spot television as being fairly close substitutes, typically the underlying 
evidence was been drawn from examinations of bivariate price correlations rather than 
from multivariate econometric estimates of demand cross elasticities.4 Among such 
bivariate studies are one by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (1980) which 
compared transactions prices for network and spot television (adjusted for differences 
in audience size and composition) and another due to Peterman (1979) which showed 
that the costs of reaching equivalent audiences via network and spot television were 
roughly the same. 
                                           INSERT TABLE 1 
Table 1 summarizes four recent econometric studies of market demand for media 
advertising and intermedia substitutability/complementarity. Some degree of substitutability 
was reported in all four investigations, with only Seldon and Jung (1993) finding indications of 
complementarity between their global “Print” and “Broadcast” categories in four years of their 
time series of thirty-seven annual observations. In interpreting these findings, one should note 
that the data underlying three of the four studies are either unknown mixes of national and 
local advertisers (Ekelund, Ford, and Jackson 1999,2000) or the sum of expenditures by national 
and local advertisers (Seldon and Jung 1993). As noted in Section I, there are grounds for 
expecting differences between national and local advertisers with respect to the cross-
elasticities for various media and hence aggregating their market demands may camouflage 
different patterns and levels of intermedia substitutability/complementarity among more 
                                                 
4 See Owen and Wildman (1992, Chapter 5), for further discussion.  8
finely disaggregated components. This is an empirical issue on which we provide evidence 
below. 5 
            Of the four studies summarized in Table 1, only McCullough and Waldon (1998) 
focussed exclusively on national advertisers and disaggregated media classes (network 
and spot tv).  The medians of the pairs of annual cross-elasticities reported for these two 
media were 0.106 (effect of change in network tv price on spot tv demand) and 0.079 
(effect of changes in spot tv prices on network tv demand), where the own-elasticity 
estimates indicated inelastic market demands for both media the median estimates 
being –0.777 and –0.342 for network and spot tv, respectively. Thus in accord with P1, 
we conclude that the evidence reviewed above suggests that while media substitutes 
exist, they tend not to be “close” substitutes.  
II.1.B Consumer Demand for Information 
Marshall’s second law, adapted to the demand for advertising, is that the derived 
demand for advertising will be more inelastic, other things equal, when consumers’ 
demand for information about products and services is more inelastic. The economic 
theory of advertising as information emphasizes the role of advertising in reducing the 
time consumers expend on search and hence their total (purchase price plus search 
costs) acquisition cost (Ehrlich and Fisher 1982; Nelson 1974,1975).  Despite the potential 
of media advertising to reduce search costs, to the extent that consumer demand for 
information is insensitive to the time cost of search, sellers’ derived demand for 
advertising will tend to be inelastic with respect to media prices.   
The only research estimating the elasticity of consumer demand for information of 
which we are aware is that by Moorthy, Ratchford, and Talukdar, hereafter MRT (1997) 
who report  “A puzzling but consistent empirical finding is that consumers exhibit very 
limited pre-purchase information-search activity” (p. 263).6  MRT argue that advertising 
                                                 
5 The only study of firm-level demand for advertising in different media we have encountered is that due 
to Seldon, Jewell, and O’Brien (2000). Based on data for six beer firms, they report positive cross-price 
elasticities between two global media categories (“print” and “radio”)  but negative cross-price elastiicies 
between “television” and “print.” However, intermedia substitutabilty/complementarity at the firm-level 
may be expected to differ from that at the market-level for reasons discussed later in Section VI.3  
 
6 Previous reviews of research on consumer search have drawn essentially the same conclusion. See: Alba, 
Hutchinson, and Lynch (1991) and Andreason (1991).  9
plays a critical role not only in reducing the time cost of search but also in influencing 
consumers’ prior beliefs about choice alternatives, thereby affecting the order in which 
alternatives are searched. This helps explain why consumers engage in seemingly low 
levels of external search, even when their product class involvement is high and their 
search costs are low. 
Based on their field study, MRT found that the total amount of external search 
consumers reported undertaking for new automobiles was inelastic with respect to 
consumers’ perceived search costs.  MRT’s work represents the only estimate of the 
elasticity of consumer demand for information uncovered in the literature known to the 
present authors.  In the case of low involvement packaged goods where consumers 
appear to rely relatively more on internal (memory-based) as opposed to external 
search (Alba, Hutchinson, and Lynch 1991), we conjecture that consumer demand for 
information for such products and services will also tend to be inelastic.  Although the 
empirical evidence presently available is very limited, it is plausible to postulate that 
consumers’ demand for information is inelastic, thereby rendering more inelastic the 
derived demand for advertising. Obviously, more empirical research on this topic is 
needed. 
II.1.C Elasticity of Supply of Media Advertising 
Marshall argued that the demand for an input was more price inelastic, ceteris 
paribus, the more price inelastic is the supply of other inputs. While the long-run supply 
of advertising time and/or space can be presumed to be highly elastic for all the major 
media, there are good reasons for expecting that the short-run elasticity of supply varies 
considerably by medium.7    Bowman (1976) estimated the elasticity of supply for 
network television commercials to be 0.15 using monthly observations for the 1964-69 
period.  This relatively inelastic estimate of the short-run supply of television 
advertising may reflect the fixed number of commercial slots available in the short-run 
  
 
7 Jung and Seldon (1995) estimated the long-run elasticity of supply of total advertising (national and    
  local)  to be infinite. 
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for any program and/or viewing period.  In contrast, such binding constraints are less 
likely to be operative for other media and thus for a medium like direct mail, we would 
expect the short-run elasticity of supply to be substantial. 
More generally, we conjecture that for broadcast media and outdoor advertising, 
short-run supply elasticities will tend to be relatively small but for print media, they 
will be considerably larger.  We discuss intermedia differences in the elasticity of short-
run supply further in Section VI.2 below. 
II.1.D Advertising’s Share of Total Costs 
Marshall’s fourth law of demand, often dubbed “the importance of being 
unimportant,” posits that the demand for an input is more price inelastic, ceteris paribus, 
the smaller is its share of total costs. In the current context, we use advertising-to-sales 
(A/S) dollars ratios as a proxy for advertising’s share of total costs. In 1994, national 
advertising represented 1.3% of Gross Domestic Product while local advertising 
represented 0.9%.  A/S ratios are known to vary markedly across firms and industries, 
e.g., being greater for experience goods than for search goods (Nelson 1974) and higher 
for new products than for established ones (Farris and Albion 1981).  Data on A/S ratios 
for the 200 four-digit SIC industries with the largest advertising expenditures in 1994 
show that the median ratio was 2.4%, with a range from 0.2% to 16.4% (Advertising Age 
1994).  The distribution of A/S ratios across industries is markedly skewed but only 
13.5% of the industries had A/S ratios between 5% and 10% and just 5% of the 
industries had A/S ratios in excess of 10%.  This suggests that instances where outlays 
for media advertising account for a substantial share of total costs are more likely to be 
the exception rather than the rule.  As a consequence, we expect generally low A/S 
ratios to contribute to the inelasticity of market demand for an advertising medium. 
 
II.2 Empirical Evidence on the Own-Price Elasticity of Demand for Media Advertising 
With the insights from Marshall’s four laws of demands adapted to national 
advertisers’ demand for media time and space as background, we now briefly 
summarize the available empirical literature reporting own-price elasticity estimates for 
various advertising media.  11
The earliest study of which we are aware is that by Bowman (1976), who estimated a 
simultaneous equations model using monthly data for the period 1964-69. He reported 
an estimated price elasticity of market demand by national advertisers in all three 
networks of   -0.73 (the 95% confidence interval ranged from -0.35 to -1.12). A later 
study by Busterna (1987) employed a series of single equation demand models and 
1971-1985 annual data and reported an own-price elasticity estimate of  -0.8 for 
newspaper advertising. Jung and Seldon (1995) investigated demand for total 
advertising using annual data for 1972-87 which aggregated expenditures in all media 
by both national and local advertisers. Their estimate of own-price elasticity of –0.17 
indicated that demand for total advertising was quite price inelastic.  
 Own-elasticity estimates were also reported in the four more recent studies of 
market demand for media advertising summarized in Table 1.  The estimates reported 
by Seldon and Jung (1993)  and McCullough and Waldon (1998) indicated inelastic 
market demand for all the media categories investigated in those studies.  Specifically, 
for a representative year (1969) from their time series, Seldon and Jung reported own- 
elasticity estimates of -0.4 for the aggregate “broadcast” category, -0.4 for another 
aggregate category, “print,” -0.7 for direct mail, and about -0.8 for the residual “other” 
category.  McCullough and Waldon estimated the own-elasticities for network and spot 
television to be –0.776 and –0.384, respectively for the mid-point (1977) of their time 
series.  
The other two studies included in Table 1 due to  Ekelund, Ford, and Jackson (1999, 
2000) both found evidence of elastic demand.  Their estimates of –2 .1 for the own-price 
elasticity of demand for spot radio and –4.3 for spot television are by far the largest we 
have uncovered in the literature. Note however, that whereas both of these estimates 
are based on data for a cross section of the largest regional media markets, the 
observations used by  Seldon and Jung and McCullough and Waldon were for the total 
U.S. 
  The only study of demand for different media at the level of the firm (rather than 
the market) known to us is that due to Seldon, Jewell, and O’Brien (2000). Their analysis  12
utilized a time series (1983-1994) of quarterly expenditures for six major brewers in 
three global media classes.  The own-price elasticity estimates at the mean of the 
observations indicated that demand for “print” (magazines, newspapers, and outdoor) 
and “radio” (network and spot) were both elastic  (–1.70 and –7.7, respectively) while 
that for “television” (network and spot) was inelastic (-0.248).  For reasons discussed 
later in Section VI.3, the elasticities of demand for media time and space by individual 
firms would be expected to differ from those for the market as a whole. 
Finally, using data on “advertising expenses” reported in corporate tax returns 
over the period 1947-1969, Ehrlich and Fisher (1982) found own-price elasticities greater 
than unity (in absolute terms) for several industry sectors roughly corresponding to 
one- and two-digit SIC classifications. It is difficult to interpret these estimates since 
what is reported in Statistics of Income as “advertising expense” represents the 
combined total of deductible expenses for promotions (consumer and trade), sampling 
and publicity in addition to that for media advertising (cf. Rogers and Tockle 1995). 
Overall then, we conclude that the bulk of the available empirical evidence is 
consistent with P2, i.e., market demand by national advertisers for the major classes of 
media tends to be price inelastic. 
III.  ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND METHODS 
III.1 Model Specification 
As noted above, existing studies of demand for media advertising have typically 
investigated an unspecified mix of local and national advertisers or the sum of the two. 
Since there are good reasons to expect differences in price elasticities of demand for 
national and local advertisers, here we focus our attention only on national advertisers, 
and leave the analysis of local advertisers for future research. Moreover, we 
disaggregate expenditures by national advertisers into eight media categories, the 
largest number for which we can obtain consistent annual data from 1960 onward.  
Numerous mathematical functional forms can be employed for empirical 
implementation.  A rather common formulation in empirical econometrics is the  13
translog (transcendental logarithmic) model, which can be interpreted as a second order 
Taylor’s series approximation in logarithms to an arbitrary homogeneous cost  
function.8  The translog advertising cost function can be written as follows: 
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                  (1) 
where the α’s and β’s (βij =βji) are unknown parameters to be estimated; the Pi are 
media prices per unit of exposure; A is the total output quantity (in exposure units) of 
advertising effort employed; the Zk are non-price exogenous variables affecting choices 
among advertising media discussed below;  Ca  is total advertising expenditures and 
equal to ∑ PiAi, where the Ai denotes the quantity of exposures for the various media.   
Following Shepard (1970), cost-minimizing demand equations for the various 
advertising media cost share equations can be obtained by logarithmically 
differentiating Eq. (1) with respect to the various media prices, thereby yielding media-
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There exists a variety of measures of substitution possibilities among the inputs.  
With the translog function, the common own-price elasticity Eii of demand can be 
shown to be: 
Eii ≡
∂ln Ai






,i = 1,K,N (3) 
                                                 
8 See Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau (1973).  14























   (4) 
where the Si and Sj are the shares of total advertising expenditures realized by media i 
and media j, respectively.  Curvature restrictions imply that the Eii ≤ 0; hence when Eij > 
0 then Ai and Aj are price substitutes, and if Eij < 0, then Ai and Aj are price 
complements.   
 
III.2 Exogenous Influences on the Demand for Media Advertising 
 
A review of the advertising literature suggests two categories of factors besides 
relative prices that are hypothesized to have influenced media shares during the period 
1960-1994. The first comprises the following consumer economic and demographic 
characteristics that the economic theory of advertising as information suggests affect the 
attractiveness of audiences delivered by the mass media as target groups for national 
advertisers’ products and services:  (a) components of personal consumption 
expenditures; (b) female labor force participation rates; and (c) the purchasing power of 
family households.  Factor (a) captures the distinction between search and experience 
goods which differ in advertising intensity (Nelson 1974) while factors (b) and (c) are 
proxies for influences on consumer search costs (Pashigian and Bowen 1994). 
For the second category, namely, technological and regulatory influences, we 
utilized measures of three variables:  (a) expenditures on computer technology; (b) 
growth of cable and syndicated television as an advertising medium; and (c) the 1971 
ban on tobacco advertising in broadcast media. Details pertaining to variable definitions 
and data sources are presented in Table 2.  
 
III.3 Estimation Procedure 
  15
  Our theoretical model consists of the eight share equations (see Eq. (2)) derived 
from the translog cost function.  Since the share equations sum to unity at each annual 
observation, only seven of the eight equations are linearly independent.  We add a 
normal disturbance term to each of the seven equations and specify that the resulting 
random disturbance vector is identically distributed.  Following Berndt and Savin 
(1975), we allow for first order autocorrelation of this disturbance vector; provided that 
the autocovariance matrix is diagonal with equal diagonal elements, the resulting 
estimates are numerically invariant to the choice of which equation is deleted.  We 
arbitrarily choose to delete the direct mail media share and estimate directly the 
remaining seven equations.  Since “adding up” of the share equations implies that  






i β β α i, j = 1,...,8, estimates of α1, β1j and β1k can be obtained 
indirectly by manipulating the parameters directly established.9 
Although media prices may well be exogenous at the level of the individual 
vehicles, for the market as a whole, prices and quantities of the various media are likely 
to be jointly determined. To allow for possible simultaneous equations bias, we treat 
media prices as endogenous and utilize data series for a number of other exogenous 
variables as instruments in the iterative, three-stage least squares estimation process.10  
We test for exogeneity of price using a Hausman (1978) specification test. We also 
investigated a more restrictive grouping of the media into a set of composite categories 
similar to those employed by Seldon and Jung (1993), namely print (magazines plus 
newspapers), broadcast (network plus spot for both radio and television), direct mail, 
                                                 
9 With 34 generalized first difference observations in each of the 7 linearly independent share   
    equations, there is a total of 238 observations. In the 7 share equations, there are 7 different constant    
    terms,  28 distinct parameters on the price variables, and 56 distinct parameters on the non-price  
    variables, for a total of 91 distinct parameters; this leaves 147 residual degrees of freedom (238-147=91). 
    Note that the number of parameters appearing in each equation is 16 (though many cross-equation    
    restictions occur), much less than the 34 annual  time series observations. 
 
10 We employed as instruments data on:  broadcast industry earnings; cost of materials for the publishing 
industry; a price index for newsprint; postal rates; the number of magazines and newspapers per capita;  
and the number of television and radio stations. Definitions and sources of these data series along with 
parameter estimates and fit measures are given in Appendix B.  
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and a residual “other” category.  We then test for the empirical validity of the 
parameter restrictions implied by Seldon and Jung’s grouping procedure.11 
IV. DATA BASE AND ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
We investigated intermedia substitutability by national advertisers among a cross-
section of eight basic classes of media: direct mail, magazines, newspapers, network 
radio, spot radio, network television, spot television, and outdoor.  Each medium’s 
annual share of total national advertising expenditures was computed using national 
advertisers’ annual expenditures (in current dollars) for each medium. The time series 
analyzed comprised 35 annual observations covering the period 1960-1994 which 
encompasses six business cycles as defined by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research’s dating of turning points (Boldin 1994). 
Table 1 contains operational definitions and data sources for the share and price 
variables employed, together with measures of exogenous variables considered in the 
analysis. Here, we begin by reviewing the pattern of changes in media shares and prices 
observed over the 1960-1994 period.  Then we discuss estimation results for our media 
share model, including specification checks.  Finally, we summarize the estimates 
obtained for the price parameters that are used to calculate the elasticity estimates, per 
Eq. (3) and (4) above and briefly discuss the effects of the exogenous variables. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
IV.1 Trends in Media Shares and Prices: 1960-1994 
Figure 1 present a time series plot for the shares of national advertising 
expenditures realized annually by each of the five largest media for the 35 year period 
1960-94.  As can be seen, direct mail predominated throughout the period, maintaining 
its share relatively stable at about 34% from 1960 until the late 1970s.  From 1980 
onward, its share grew steadily, reaching the 46% level by the early 1990s. 
INSERT FIGURES 1 and 2 HERE 
                                                 
11 These restrictions are also known as separability restrictions. See Berndt (1991, Chapter 9) for further            
discussion. 
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Magazines and newspapers, in contrast, experienced more or less steady declines 
in their shares.  Magazines’ share dropped from 17% to 12-13%, while newspapers’ 
share decreased by nearly half, from 14% in the early 1960s to 6-7% in the early 1990s. 
Network and spot television exhibited similar patterns of substantial growth 
throughout the 1960s.  The 1971 ban on tobacco advertising in broadcast media 
precipitated an immediate drop in their shares.  Both TV and radio recovered their pre-
tobacco ban share levels — 20% in the case of network television and 14-15% for spot 
television — by the mid-1970s.  Whereas spot television’s share subsequently remained 
relatively flat until the early 1990s, network television’s share continued its upward 
trend throughout the 1970s, peaking at 22-23% in early 1980s.  The latter’s share 
subsequently entered a period of continued decline from 1985 onward, falling to 
around 17% in 1994.   
The shares of the three smallest media are plotted in Figure 2. Network radio’s 
share remained flat throughout the 1960-1994 period, never representing as much as 1% 
of total national advertising expenditures.   Both spot radio and outdoor experienced 
slow, long-term declines in share, spot radio’s dropping from approximately 4% in 1960 
to around 3% in the early 1990s, and outdoors’ share declining from roughly 2% to 1% 
over the same period. 
The behavior of media prices is plotted in Figure 3, which presents mean annual 
percentage changes in the cost per thousand exposures (CPM) price indices for the eight 
media over the period 1960-1994.  As a summary measure, we constructed a Divisia 
price index (Diewart 1981) for all eight media combined. Figure 3 also plots mean 
changes in the eight media index, together with comparable figures for the Producer 
Price Index, Finished Consumer Goods (PPIFCG) and Consumer Price Index (CPI). The 
CPI is believed by many to overstate the rate of inflation, particularly for the 1970s and 
1980s (Gordon 1987, pp. 53-54). 
    INSERT  FIGURE  3  HERE  18
From 1961 to 1994, advertising prices for six of the eight media rose, on average, 
at a more rapid rate than did PPIFCG (the exceptions being the two small share radio 
media).  Moreover, for five of the eight media (network and spot television, direct mail, 
newspapers, and outdoor), mean CPM increases exceeded growth in the CPI.  
The relative volatility of changes in advertising rates is evident from the values of the 
coefficients of variation for annual changes in the media CPM indices reported in Figure 
3.  The standard deviation of the percent changes in CPMs exceeded the mean value for 
all four broadcast media (network and spot television and radio).  The marked 
variability in advertising prices for all of the media over the period of analysis is 
reflected in the difference between the minimum and maximum values of the eight 
coefficients of variation, 0.58 (for direct mail) and 2.01 (for network television), 
respectively.  This heterogeneity among media with respect to the rates at which prices 
have changed over time suggests that an econometric analysis of cross-price effects 
might well be informative in generating relatively precise elasticity estimate. 
IV.2 Specification Checks and Estimation Results 
A Hausman (1978) test for exogeneity suggests that media prices are jointly rather 
than exogenously determined; the χ2 test statistic is 236.92, with the .01 critical value 
being 83.49. As a check on model specification, we also grouped the media into a set of 
composite categories similar to those employed by Seldon and Jung  (1993), namely, 
print, broadcast, and direct mail.  This grouping implies restrictions, decisively rejected 
when subjected to a nested model specification test, on parameters in the share 
equations of our eight-equation model (Deaton and Muellbauer 1980, Ch. 5). Finally, to 
ensure that the own-price elasticities of demand for the two media with the smallest 
shares were non-positive, we constrained the values of βii for network radio and 
outdoor.  Three-stage least square estimates of the model’s parameters are given in 
Appenidx A (Tables A1 and A2).  Summary statistics pertaining to the model’s fit are 
presented in Table A3. 
The model fits the data quite well; the R2 value for the share equations ranges from  
0.753 to .986, exceeding .9 for six of the eight media. The estimate of ρ, the  19
autocorrelation coefficient, is -0.371 and statistically significant (t = 5.63).  We interpret 
this somewhat unusual finding as a reflection of the oscillating cycle of political 
elections in the United States, which as Coen (1994) has pointed out, has a significant 
biannual fluctuating impact on the level and composition of media advertising 
expenditures. 
IV.3 Price Parameters 
 Iterative, three-stage least squares estimates of the translog parameters that relate to 
price sensitivity are shown in Table A1 of Appendix A.  Recall from (2) that the direct 
interpretation of these symmetric (βij =βji) translog parameters is the change in the 
expenditure share of media i given a 1% change in the price of media j, ceteris paribus.12 
Of the six estimated “own-price” effects, four estimated βii‘s are positive (three 
statistically significant) and two negative (but not statistically significant).  Thus, in 
most cases, media price increases translate into expenditure share increases for that 
medium, indicating limited substitution.  Estimates of the βij parameters were 
subsequently used in (3) and (4) to generate estimates of own- and cross-price 
elasticities. 
Examining estimates of cross price effect parameters for individual media, we find 
that 20 of the 28 estimated βij (i≠j) parameters in Table A1 are statistically significant at 
the 5% level or beyond.  For magazines, network television, and outdoor, six of the 
seven, and for direct mail, newspaper, and network radio, five of the seven, βij (i≠j) 
parameters are statistically significant.  The relative frequency of statistically significant 
parameters is smaller for spot radio and spot television. 
IV.4  Effects of Exogenous Variables 
Our media share demand equations depend on various exogenous influences as 
well as media prices and we include a number of demand shifting variables in the share 
                                                 
12 Note that from (5), the dependent variable is expenditure share (not quantity share) and hence the 
parameters, βii and βij, reflect the net effects on revenues of changes in both quantities and prices. 
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model.13  The effects of these variables on advertising media shares can be directly 
inferred by examining the parameter estimates in Table A2 of Appendix A, subject to 
the constraints imposed by the system of share equations, to wit:  all parameter 
estimates for a given exogenous variable must sum to one.  General patterns can 
nonetheless be recognized. 
With the ban on broadcast advertising for tobacco products, media shares 
increased for direct mail and newspapers and, as expected, decreased for network 
television and spot television (each of the four corresponding estimated coefficients is 
statistically significant at the 5% level).  Similarly, consumers’ spending for non-
durables correlates negatively and substantially with the media share for direct mail, 
but positively with the media shares of magazines, newspapers, spot radio, network, 
and spot television and outdoor (seven of the eight estimated coefficients for consumer 
non-durable spending are statistically significant).  These findings are not unexpected, 
manufacturers of non-durables (e.g., packaged goods) have traditionally emphasized 
the use of mass media over direct consumer communication.  Consumer outlays for 
services, on the other hand, are (significantly) negatively correlated with the media 
shares of newspapers, spot radio, and outdoor (four of the eight estimated coefficients 
are statistically significant at the 5% level).   
The observed pattern of consumer expenditure effects on media shares is 
interesting for two reasons.  First, the media that have benefited most by the recent 
growth of the service sector as a proportion of the U.S. economy are network radio and 
television and direct mail.  In contrast, the more “regional” media traditionally 
dominated by local advertisers (i.e., the retail sector) have benefited least.  (Our 
measures of advertising expenditures cover only national advertisers and all advertising 
activity by local service businesses usually associated with local/regional media is 
excluded.)  Second, deregulation of the airline and telecommunications industries 
                                                 
13 A dummy variable for Olympics/U.S. presidential election years and a measure of the installed base of 
VCRs were initially included as exogenous variables, both turned out to be statistically insignificant and 
were subsequently deleted. 
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which includes some of the largest national advertisers in the service sector, has exerted 
a significant impact on advertising spending as competition in these industries 
increasingly revolves around escalating advertising.  Consumer spending on durables, 
on the other hand, exhibits no clear pattern of effects on media shares (only two of the 
eight estimated coefficients being statistically significant). 
Increased female participation in the labor force correlated ceteris paribus with 
increases in the media shares of newspapers, spot radio, and outdoor and with 
decreases in the shares of direct mail, network radio, and spot television (the impact on 
the latter media being only marginally significant statistically).  Our magazines’ share 
variable may be too aggregated to reflect the influences of such major trends.  Very 
likely, for example, increased female participation in the labor force participation had a 
substantially negative impact on traditional women’s magazines (e.g., those related to 
home and cooking), but a largely positive impact on news weeklies and business-
related magazines.  Extrapolating, we might intuitively conjecture a positive effect on 
newspapers, reflecting working women’s heightened interest in news events, and, with 
respect to outdoor and spot radio, that working and commuting are more likely than 
carpooling to occasion women’s viewing of billboards and listening to car or portable 
radios. 
Expenditures on information technology exerted a large positive impact on 
direct mail and a large negative impact on network television. Direct marketers tended 
to benefit most from technological advances that afforded increasingly sophisticated 
and cost-effective ways to target consumers and track advertising response.  For 
television, benefits from advances in computer technology were outweighed by relative 
increases in the attractiveness of alternative media, as suggested by the positive signs of 
the parameter estimates for all other media save network and spot television.  
Parameter estimates for cable and syndicated televisions (CTV) suggest that 
growth of this alternative medium has most adversely affected network television.  
That the signs of the parameters for five of the other six media are also negative 
suggests that national advertisers have employed cable and syndicated television as a  22
substitute for virtually all other media (negative coefficients for direct mail and 
magazines, as well as for network television, were statistically significant).  The positive 
(and statistically significant) parameter estimate for newspapers, the single exception to 
this pattern of negative coefficients, implies a complementary relationship between that 
medium and cable and syndicated television.   
Increases in the purchasing power of households headed by 25-44 year-olds 
affected positively (and statistically significantly), only direct mail, which might be 
construed to reflect increasing time sensitivity, an effect likely to be especially prevalent 
among dual career and single parent households.14  Such households’ use of direct mail 
to reduce search costs would seem to account for the negative relationship between 
their increased purchasing power and the media shares of magazines, network 
television and (less statistically significantly) network radio. 
IV. ELASTICITY  ESTIMATES 
Estimates of own- and cross-price demand elasticities reflect, ceteris paribus, the 
percent change in quantity of advertising demanded from a medium, given a small 
(say, 1%) change in the price of a medium.  Because they depend on the estimated βij 
parameters and time-varying values of the shares (Eqs. (3) and (4), Section 3), these 
demand elasticities are not constant over time.  Four important conclusions emerge 
from our analysis of the mean values of the 34 annual own- and cross-price elasticities 
estimated for the period 1961-1994 and presented in Table 3. 
 
                                                  INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
(i)  Mean own-price elasticity estimates in Table 3 suggest that national 
advertisers’ demand for seven of the eight media is price inelastic.  
Newspaper advertising has an approximately unit mean demand elasticity  
            (-1.06).  Mean demand elasticities for four of the other media are significantly      
            less than zero (p < .01) at -0.75 for direct mail, -0.69 for network television,    
                                                 
14 See Pashigian and Bowen (1994) for an analysis of the effects of two-earner households and women’s 
earnings on search and shopping time. 
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            -0.41 for outdoor, and -0.25 for network radio.  Inelastic demand is indicated    
for the remaining media, but the estimates were insufficiently precise to differ 
significantly from zero at the 1% level, although two of the three were 
significant at the 5% level (magazines at -0.32 and spot radio at -0.25).  The 
mean estimated elasticity for spot television (-0.26) exceeded its estimated 
mean standard error but failed to achieve significance at even the 10% level. 
 
(ii)  Mean cross-price elasticity estimates suggest that intermedia substitutability 
is slightly more prevalent than intermedia complementarity.15  Of the 28 pairs 
of mean cross-price elasticities, (off-diagonal entries in Table 3), 57% (16/28) 
indicate substitute relations, by virtue of the positive signs of the estimated 
values.16  Moreover, the precision of the estimates tended to be greater for 
substitute than for complementary relationships; about two-thirds (22/32) of 
the positive mean cross-price elasticities were statistically significant (as 
judged by a two tail test, p < .05), compared to half (12/24) of the negative 
cross-price elasticities. 
 
(iii)  The magnitude of cross-price effects, whether substitutes or complements, 
tends to be limited, as can be seen from the size of the mean cross-price 
elasticities in Table 3.17  The median value of the 32 positive mean cross-price 
elasticities (substitutes) is 0.27 (range: 0.01 to 1.23) and only four exceed unity.  
The median value of the 24 negative cross-price elasticities (complements) is -
0.20 (range:  -0.01 to -1.63), with only two less than minus one. 
 
(iv)      Whereas direct mail and newspapers tend to be related to the alternative       
media primarily as substitutes, cross-price elasticities indicate a balance 
between substitutability and complementarity for the other six             
            media.  Substitution holds for six of the seven cross-price elasticities    
            involving direct mail and for five of the seven involving newspapers.  For the   
            other six media, three or four of the seven price interdependencies are    
                                                 
15 Note that the translog model yields pairs of cross-elasticities that are symmetric with respect to sign 
(since βij = βji), but asymmetric in magnitude (since in general, Si ≠ Sj). 
 
16 For all 28 pairwise relationships, the cross-price elasticities estimated for each annual observation 
remained sign-invariant over the entire 1961-1994 period. 
 
17 This conclusion is also supported by an analysis of the Morishima elasticies of substitution reported in   
   Appendix C. 
  24




VI.1 Media Selection Practices and Institutional Factors 
The results reported in Section V indicate that national advertisers’ demands for 
time and space in the major media tend to be price inelastic, while interdependencies 
among market demands for the separate media involve substitute and complementary 
relationships, both characteristically weak.  These demand conditions are consistent not 
only with our two propositions about the derived demand by national advertisers’ for 
media time and space (discussed in Section II), but also with media selection practices 
and institutional arrangements that have long prevailed in the U.S. advertising 
industry.  
Observers of media planning practices typically describe the process as a sequential 
one and emphasize the differences between intermedia and intramedia decisions. 
Intermedia choices are often effectively preempted by judgments about the fit between 
message strategy and alternative media exercised in the early stages of a campaign’s 
development and prices are frequently a secondary consideration (Jones 1992).  To the 
extent that intermedia comparisons are undertaken at all, they are likely to be made 
informally on the basis of criteria of uncertain validity. Data to support intermedia 
comparisons are lacking (Raymond 1976, Stewart and Ward 1994).  As a result, the 
application of optimization methods to media planning is primarily concerned with 
intramedia decisions (vehicle selection and scheduling) rather than supporting 
intermedia choices (Ha 1995, Rust 1986). 
An additional factor contributing to the relative price insensitivity of national 
advertisers’ choice of media mix is the existence of a classic principal-agent incentive 
                                                 
18 The signs of the cross elasticities for network and spot television shown in Table 3 are negative 
implying complementarity.  This would appear to be an anomolous result in light of the evidence 
discussed in Section II.1.A that these two media are substitutes.  It also bears noting that the cross-
elasticity estimates for network and spot television just achieve significance at the .05 level and the 
estimate of the own-elasticity for spot television, while having the expected sign, lacks precision, with its 
t-ratio being only 1.42. 
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problem which arises from the role “full service” advertising agencies traditionally 
played in media selection. Media planning and placement are but one component of the 
bundle of services full service agencies typically perform for national advertisers. An 
advertising agency, when compensated by a fixed percentage of a client’s media 
expenditures, has relatively little incentive, at least in the short run, to seek out the least 
cost combination of media.  Fixed media commission rates were the dominant mode of 
agency compensation until the mid-1980’s when studies conducted among large 
national advertisers began to detect a shift away from reliance on the traditional 15% 
media commission rate (Lundin and Jones 1998). Thus, both the nature of media 
selection practices and the vertical structure of the advertising industry might be 
expected to render market demand for media advertising price inelastic and intermedia 
price substitutability weak.  
VI.2 Implications of Aggregate Media Cross-Price Elasticities 
Our estimates of relatively weak substitute/complement relationships between the 
eight media classes imply correspondingly small cross-price elasticities between 
vehicles within the various media classes.  Specifically, for illustrative purposes, assume 
there are two media classes, medium A and medium B, the former comprised of 
vehicles i and j  and the latter vehicles k and l. Defining the cross-price elasticities as in 
Eq. (3) above, Berndt and Christensen (1973) have shown that aggregating vehicle  i and 
j into a composite medium A and similarly aggregating vehicles k and l into a 
composite medium B, is equivalent to assuming the following equality restrictions on 
the cross-price elasticities: 
                                           E ik  = Ejk  =  EAk 
          E  il  =  E jl  = E Al                                            (5) 
              E ki =  E li  =  E Bi 
          E  kj =  E lj =  E Bj 
  These equality relationships imply that the relatively small estimated values of 
the cross-price elasticities among the major media classes reported here will be  26
accompanied by cross-price elasticities between two vehicles in two different media 
classes that are also correspondingly small. Because the required data are not available, 
we have by necessity assumed the existence of eight aggregate media classes and have 
not been able to test this assumption empirically. However, because we decisively 
rejected parameter restrictions implied by Seldon and Jung’s (1993) aggregation 
procedure in which our eight classes were combined into four, implicitly we rejected 
the cross-price elasticity equality restrictions, analogous to those in Eq. (5) above, that 
are implied by Seldon and Jung’s approach.  
  In particular, whereas Seldon and Jung’s aggregation procedure assumes that 
network radio and network television have equal cross-elasticities with magazines, our 
estimate of these elasticities is signficantly negative and significantly positive, 
respectively (see Table 3). 
VI.3 Intermedia vs. Intramedia Price Sensitivity 
Our findings of inelastic market demands and weak cross-media price effects are 
also congruent with descriptions of media planning as a multistage decision process in 
which intermedia choices are made on strategic and creative grounds, with price playing 
a more important role in subsequent intramedia comparisons.  Consider how the 
elasticity of demand faced by particular advertising vehicles within some media 
category relates to the market demand for the medium as a whole, when the latter is 











F E e s ii v η                                                   (6) 
where ev denotes the price elasticity of demand for advertising vehicle v (ev ≤ 0); Eii is 
the market (own) price elasticity for medium i (Eii ≤ 0); F is the number of identical firms 
comprising the medium/industry (F>1); and ηs is the elasticity of supply for the F-1 
other firms (ηs ≥0). 
                                                 
19 See Carlton and Perloff (1990, pp. 79-81) for the derivation. 
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Thus, it may be seen from (6) that the demand elasticity associated with a 
particular vehicle depends not only on the elasticity of market demand for the medium, 
but also on the market structure of the medium/industry (i.e., the number and size 
distribution of vehicles within the same media category) and the elasticity of the supply 
of the medium (i.e., responsiveness of capacity to changes in price).20  In general, (6) 
implies that the elasticity of demand at the vehicle level is greater (in absolute value) 
than that at the market level.  This distinction is in line with Coen’s (1983) observation 
that the process whereby media plans are adjusted to shifts in intermedia price 
differentials is phased or hierarchical, wherein intramedia changes are expected to 
precede a realignment of intermedia allocations. 
When applied to media advertising, a further implication of (6) is that, although 
own-price elasticities may vary little across media at the market demand level, there is 
likely to be considerable variation in the elasticity of demand for individual vehicles 
across media categories, particularly in the short run because of intermedia differences 
in market structure and the elasticity of supply. 
Table 4 cross-classifies the eight major classes of advertising media by market 
structure and short-run elasticity of supply.  There being practically no published 
empirical estimates of supply elasticities for advertising media, we adopt a simple 
dichotomous classification of the eight media for this construct.  The vertical ordering of 
the media reflects the level of concentration within each of the eight categories as 
indicated by prior studies and empirical evidence.  A detailed explanation of the bases 
used for the classification in Table 3 is provided in Appendix D. 
                                            INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
                                                 
20 The relationship between the elasticity of demand for a specific supplier (vehicle) and that for the 
industry (medium) as whole depicted in (6) assumes the special case of identical suppliers.  Of course, the 
nature of that relationship will vary with changes in the assumption made about the market structure 
(number and size distribution) of suppliers (vehicles) comprising the industry (medium).  For an analysis 
of the case where the market structure consists of a dominant firm and a competitive fringe, see Carlton 
an Perloff (1990, pp. 205-207). 
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Relating the classification in Table 4 to (6), we see that network television and direct 
mail are polar opposites with respect to both market structure and short-run elasticity 
of supply.  Whereas there were only three television networks from 1960-1990, the 
number of firms supplying direct mail advertising services grew from fewer than a 
thousand to nearly four thousand over the same period, the four firm concentration 
ratio being only 19%.  Similarly, in the short-run, say one quarter, a network’s supply of 
slots for some program or viewing period is essentially fixed, the elasticity of supply 
approaching its lower bound of zero. 21  Direct mail campaigns, in contrast, are readily 
expanded or contracted over short periods of time, and we would expect this short-run 
elasticity of supply to be substantial.  Hence, even though market demands for both 
media appears similarly inelastic (-0.69 and -0.75 in Table 2), differences in market 
structure and supply conditions tend to make the demand faced by a supplier of direct 
mail services much more price elastic than that faced by a television network. 
VI.4 Distinguishing Between Intermedia  Substitutes and Complements 
The estimates of cross-price elasticities (summarized in Table 2) reveal a persistent 
pattern of interdependencies among the eight media classes over the 1961-94 period 
consisting of an almost equally balanced mix of substitutive and complementary 
relations. This pattern of pairwise interrelationships among the media raises a more 
fundamental question: What determines whether a pair of media is substitutes or 
complements?  Are our estimates consistent with what one might expect a priori? 
Elsewhere, we (Silk, Klein, and Berndt 2001) proposed the following hypotheses 
pertaining to underlying media characteristics which serves to differentiate between 
substitutes and complements:   
A pair of media are more likely to be substitutes than complements when they offer 
national advertisers: (H1) similar levels of audience addressability (Porter 1976); (H2) 
dissimilar levels of audience control over attention to advertising (Owen 1999)); and (H3) 
dissimilar levels of flexibility with respect to contractual requirements (Yang 1962a,b). 
                                                 
21 Bowman (1976) estimated the elasticity of market supply for network television commercials to be 0.15 
using quarterly data. 
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These hypotheses were supported in a preliminary test  conducted using the 
cross-elasticities reported in Table 1.22  Thus, our estimates of the patterns of 
substitutability and complementary relationships among the eight advertising media 
are consistent with a priori expectations. 
 
VII.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our econometric analysis of national advertisers’ demand for media advertising has 
yielded two main conclusions: market demand for seven of the eight major mass 
advertising media is price inelastic23; and interdependencies among these demands 
involve a balanced mix of substitute and complementary relationships, both 
characteristically weak.  
Inelastic market demand for the major categories of media advertising is congruent 
with the treatment of national advertisers’ demand for media time and space as being 
derived from consumers’ demand for information about the goods and services sold by 
national advertisers.  In the case of media advertising, the factors which theory 
identifies to be basic determinants of the elasticity of derived demand would appear to 
operate in the case of media advertising so as to generate inelastic market demand — 
although our knowledge of the relevant underlying parameters affecting advertising is 
quite primitive. 
The demand conditions revealed here also appear to be consistent with the nature of 
institutional arrangements and media selection practices that have long prevailed in the 
United States.  Inelastic market demand and weak cross-media effects are congruent 
                                                 
22 An ordered probit was estimated where the 28 cross-elasticities reported in Table 2 were as a 
trichotomized dependent variable (substitute vs. independent vs. compliment) and related to the 
similarity/dissimilarity of the media pairs with respect to each of the three hypothesized media factors. 
The signs of the coefficients for all three factors were in the hypothesized direction with the ratios of the 
estimated coefficients to  their standard errors being 2.3 and 1.7 for audience addressability and 
contractual flexibility, respectively, but only 1.1 for audience control. See Silk, Klein, and Berndt (2001) for 
details. 
23 As may be seen from Table 2, the exception is newspapers for which the own-elasticity estimate was  
    -1.06, indicating a slightly elastic demand, the estimate being within one standard error of the inelastic  
   region.   30
with industry practices in which media planning is conducted as a multistage decision 
process, with intermedia choices made primarily on strategic and creative grounds, 
followed by price-sensitive intramedia comparisons of alternative vehicles.  Full-service 
advertising agencies have historically played a critical role in media selection, and their 
reliance on media commissions as the basis for agency compensation may have served 
to mitigate price sensitivity in media buying decisions.  
Finally, there is evidence that the pattern of substitution and complementary 
relationships among media classes reported here is associated with three basic 
attributes which differentiate the media from one another, namely the addressability or 
divisibility of audience reached by a medium; the amount of control a medium’s 
audience can exercise over exposure to advertising messages carried in that medium; 
and the degree of flexibility with respect to the contractual arrangements required by 
the medium.  
Driven by the rapid diffusion of digital technology, changing macroeconomic 
conditions, and shifts in regulatory policy, interest in research on the economics 
underlying the evolution of the demand and supply of media advertising is likely to 
increase. Elsewhere we have argued that the traditional pattern of inelastic demand and 
weak substitutability/complementarity reported here can be expected to change 
substantially in the future under the growing new technology threat of direct and 
indirect substitutes and rising demands by national advertisers for efficiency and 
accountability in media selection (Silk, Klein, and Berndt 1999).   31
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Abbreviation     Definition 
SHRit   Medium i’s share of total expenditures (current dollars) made by U.S. national 
advertisers in year t, i = 1,...,8; t = 1960,...,1994, where: 







i t all for SHR  
 
CPMit   A price index reflecting the cost per thousand exposures in medium i during year t 
(Cit, current dollars), relative to the cost in the base period (Ci0 for 1982-84), i.e., 
CPMit = (Cit/Ci0)∗100 
 
PCEkt   Personal consumption expenditures in category k in year t (billions of constant 1982 
dollars), where k =1,2,3, denotes durable goods, nondurable goods, and services, 
respectively 
 
FLPt   Civilian female labor force as a percentage of female civilian noninstitutionalized 
population age 16 and over 
 
HPPt   Purchasing power of family households (millions of constant 1992 dollars) with 
heads of household aged 25-44 in year t—calculated by multiplying the median 
income (constant 1982 dollars) by the number of households for this age cohort 
 
CSEt   Expenditures on computer software and services (millions of constant 1987 dollars) 
in year t—calculated by deflating these expenditures in current dollars with the 
Producer Price Index Finished Goods (1987=100).  This series begins in 1965 and 
hence for t prior to that, CSE = 0. 
 
CTVt   Index of share of total national advertising expenditures in cable network and 
syndication television in year t, relative to that share for 1980 — where CTV = 0 for t 
= 1960,...,1979; CTV = 1 for 1980 and CTV > 0, thereafter. 
 
BANt   Index to represent the effect of the ban on tobacco advertising in broadcast media 
initiated on January 2, 1971. We hypothesized the effect to be greatest in 1971 but 
gradually diminishing thereafter as media mixes were adjusted (Teinowitz 1995). 
Thus, the index is defined as BANt = 0 for t = 1960,...,1970, and BANt = 1/y+1, 
thereafter, where y = 1 for t = 1971 and y is increased by 1 in each subsequent year. 
 
Data Sources:  Annual expenditures by medium for national and local advertising are regularly reported in Advertising Age (e.g., 
Vol. 64, May 3, 1993, p. 4) and the extended time series are published in the Statistical Abstract of the United States (e.g., 114 ed., 
1994, p.580). The indices of cost per thousand exposures are found in “McCann-Erickson Cost Indices,” (unpublished paper, 
November,1995),  available from Robert Coen, Senior Vice-President and Director of Forecasting, Universal McCann, New York.  
 
                       Recent data on PCE and FLP are taken from Statisical Abstract, 1995.  Earlier data for these two series are reported in 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts, Vol. 2, 1959-88 and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
Bulletin 2307 and annual editions of Employment and Earnings. HPP was constructed from data reported in U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-20.  Expenditures on computer software and services are published annually by the 





MEAN VALUE OF ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL OWN- (Eii) AND CROSS-PRICE 
ELASTICITIES (Eij) OVER THE PERIOD 1961-94 
 


















































































































































































aRead: Cross-elasticity of demand for Network Radio (Column variable) with respect to 
the price of Network TV (Row variable). Own-price elasticities are unshaded. 
Substitutive relations are lightly shaded and complimentary relations are darkly 
shaded.  41
Table 4 
CLASSIFYING NATIONAL ADVERTISING MEDIA BT MARKET STRUCTURE AND 
THE SHORT-RUN ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY 
 
Market Structure 











Network TV (99%) 
 















Direct Mail (19%) 
Low Concentration  Spot Radio (12%)   
 
 
a Estimate of four firm concentration ratios for 1995 in parentheses—see Appendix C for 
details. 
b This number represents the four firm percentage of total (circulation plus local and 





















     A P P E N D I X   A  
Table A1 
 
THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF PRICE PARAMETERS FOR MEDIA 
SHARE MODEL 





























α2  0.49 
(1.13) 
β23  -0.05 
(2.94) 
β45  -0.03 
(4.42) 
α3  1.47 
(5.27) 
β24  -1.69e3 
(0.21) 
β46  -0.01 
(2.42) 
α4  0.11 
(0.82) 
β25  0.08 
(3.99) 
β47  4.61e3 
(0.75) 
α5  1.24 
(2.12) 
β26  -0.01 
(3.69) 
β48  -0.01 
(2.83) 
α6  0.04 
(0.71) 
β27  -0.04 
(2.10) 
β55  0.02 
(0.78) 
α7  -1.38 
(3.29) 
β28  -0.01 
(2.13) 
β56  1.60e3 
(0.49) 
α8  0.41 
(5.54) 
β33  -0.01 
(0.72) 
β57  -0.06 
(2.89) 
β11  -0.04 
(1.26) 
β34  0.01 
(2.10) 
β58  -0.02 
(5.00) 
β12  -0.04 
(1.99) 
β35  -0.03 
(1.78) 
β66  0.006 
      (NA) 
β13  0.04 
(2.85) 
β36  0.48e3 
(0.13) 
β67  0.01 
(2.87) 
β14  9.97e3 
(0.16) 
β37  0.02 
(1.61) 
β68  0.01 
(7.23) 
β15  0.04 
(1.76) 
β38  0.01 
(2.99) 
β77  0.08 
(3.24) 
β16  -5.73e3 
(2.31) 
   β78  -0.01 
(1.45) 
β17  -0.01 
(0.56) 
   β88  .009 
      (NA) 
β18  0.01 
(3.97) 
 
   ρ  -0.37 
(5.63) 
Key:  1 = Direct Mail  2 = Magazines  3 = Newspapers  4 = Spot Radio 
  5 = Network TV  6 = Network 
Radio 
7 = Spot TV  8 = Outdoor  43




THREE STAGE LEAST SQUARES ESTIMATES OF PARAMETERS FOR EXOGENOUS 
VARIABLES (Biz) IN MEDIA SHARE MODEL  
 

























































































































































































































































































FIRST STAGE MEDIA PRICE EQUATIONS 
 




Table B1 presents definitions of the variables used as instruments in the first stage 




Time series for radio and television employee average hourly earnings (BRE) are found 
in  the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1960-1995 and regularly published in 
Employment and Earnings, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bulletins 2370 and 2429 
Washington, D.C. Data on the number of TV and Radio Stations are published in the Annual 
Report of the Federal Communications Commission, Washington, D.C., U.S. Government 
Printing Office. Data on the number of newspapers and magazines in circulation (MCAP and 
NCAP) are published in the Editor and Publisher International Year Book Annual, Editor and 
Publisher Co., New York, NY. The Producer Price Index for Newsprint (PPIN) is obtained from 
the U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and also regularly published in Statistical 
Abstracts. Third Class Postal Rates (3rd  class) were obtained from United States Post Office, as 
published in U.S. Domestic Postal Rates 1872-1993, Tables 27-1, 2, 3, 4 and 28-1-6. Cost of 
materials for the publishing industry is reported in  the Census of Manufactures, series MC87-
1-27A, and the Annual Survey of Manufactures. 
 
B2.0  First Stage Equation Results 
 
Results from regressions of the prices on the instruments are included in Tables B2 and 
B3. All variables measured in dollar terms were converted to constant (1987) dollars and 
transformed  to natural logarithms. All exogenous variables included in the price regressions 






POST  The postage price of a typical direct mail piece weighing 4 oz. sent third-class 
bulk rate. 
PPIN   A price index reflecting producer prices for newsprint. 
BRE   Average hourly earnings for radio and television employees. 
PCOG   Average cost of goods for publishers, including magazines and newspapers  
TV   The number of commercial television stations registered in the United States. 
AMRST  The number of AM radio stations registered in the United States. 
MCAP  The number of magazines published in the United States, divided by the total 
U.S. population.  






ESTIMATES OF REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR EXOGENOUS VARIABLES IN  
FIRST STAGE PRICE EQUATIONS  
 
(Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Standard Error in Parentheses) 
 





















               
PCE-  Durables  0.11 0.28 0.15 0.15  0.51  0.78 0.55  -0.02 
  (1.28) (1.23) (0.91) (0.64)  (1.87)  (2.21) (2.74)  (0.11) 
PCE-  Nondurables  -1.50 2.43 1.47 3.34  3.16  2.75 3.48  1.91 
  (4.07) (2.52) (2.09) (3.28)  (2.75)  (1.85) (4.07)  (2.01) 
PCE-  Services  0.60 -2.49 -0.94 -2.36  -2.64  -3.76 -2.63  -0.97 
  (2.86) (4.55) (2.37) (4.08)  (4.04)  (4.45) (5.40)  (1.80) 
BAN 0.01  0.01  -0.02  -0.06  -0.06  -0.04  -0.06  -0.003 
  (0.70) (0.26) (1.45) (3.01)  (2.96)  (1.250) (3.95)  (0.19) 
CTV -9.12e4 -2.73e3  3.30e3  -0.01 -2.76e3 3.70e3 -5.03e4 0.01 
  (0.31) (0.36) (0.60) (1.01)  (0.30)  (0.31) (.074)  (0.82) 
CSE 6.50e8 3.10e6 1.17e6 1.08e6 2.62e6 1.68e6 1.90e6 -1.09e6 
  (0.13) (2.42) (1.25) (0.80)  (1.72)  (0.85) (1.67)  (0.86) 
FLP 0.12  0.05  -0.11  0.18  0.94  1.86  -0.62  -0.25 
  (0.43) (0.07) (0.20) (0.24)  (1.11)  (1.69)  (.94) (0.35) 
HPP  0.373 -0.865 -0.669 -1.111  -1.483  -1.754 -1.433 -0.104 
  (2.440) (2.170) (2.300) (2.640)  (3.110)  (2.850) (4.040) (0.264)
 






ESTIMATES OF REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR INSTRUMENTS  
IN FIRST STAGE PRICE EQUATIONS  
 
(Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Standard Error in Parentheses) 
 





















POST  0.02 -0.05 -0.08 -0.03  -0.08  -0.03 -0.01  -0.08 
  (1.13) (0.99) (2.21) (0.66)  (1.43)  (0.38) (0.29)  (1.74) 
PPIN  0.01 -0.05 0.15 -0.10  0.13  0.03  0.20  -0.04 
  (0.24) (0.37) (1.47) (0.68)  (0.75)  (0.15) (1.59)  (0.31) 
BRE  0.08 -0.06 -0.13 0.25  -0.08  -0.01 -0.20  0.11 
  (1.03) (0.28) (0.85) (1.15)  (0.30)  (0.04) (1.09)  (0.53) 
PCOG  0.10 -0.07 -0.03 -0.08  0.39  0.43  0.22 -0.16 
  (1.43) (0.34) (0.21) (0.40)  (1.85)  (1.57) (1.42)  (0.89) 
TVST  0.12 -0.02 0.08 0.29  -0.10  -0.28 -0.11  0.01 
  (1.70) (0.09) (0.58) (1.49)  (0.45)  (0.98) (0.68)  (0.07) 
AMRST 0.21  1.05  -0.03  0.41  0.75  1.48  1.49  -0.32 
  (0.93) (1.78) (0.08) (0.65)  (1.06)  (1.62) (2.84)  (0.55) 
MCAP  -0.10 0.63 0.36 0.37  0.39  0.85 0.63  0.31 
  (1.58) (3.81) (2.99) (2.12)  (1.96)  (3.34) (4.32)  (1.93) 
NCAP  0.13 -0.53 -0.23 -0.40  -0.53  -1.06 -0.73  -0.18 
 (2.06)  (3.24)  (1.92)  (2.310  (2.74)  (4.21)  (5.06)  (1.10) 
 



















































ANALYSIS OF MORISHIMA RELATIVE EXPENDITURE SHARE ELASTICITIES 
  The magnitudes of own- and cross-price elasticities have implications for the patterns of 
influence occurring among a set of media as a result of changes in their relative prices.  These 
interdependencies were investigated by calculating the Morishima elasticity of substitution for 
relative expenditure shares and relative prices, (Mij), defined as (Blackorby and Russell 1981, 
1989): 
 
  M ij ≡
∂ln (Sj /S i)
∂ln (Pj /P i) A,Zand
Pj fixed (j ≠ i)
= 1+ Eii − Eij  (C1) 
 
  The Morishima relative share elasticity (Mij) answers the following question:  How 
sensitive is the share of total advertising expenditures realized by media j relative to the share 
obtained by medium i, given a small change in the relative prices due to an action taken by i, 
ceteris paribus?  It is apparent from (C1) that the sign and magnitude of Mij depend upon the 
sign and magnitude of the relevant own- (Eii) and cross-price elasticities (Eij). 
 
  In particular, the value taken by Mij reflects (a) whether demand for medium i is elastic 
or inelastic, and (b) whether medium i and j are substitutes or complements.  When Mij is zero, 
medium j’s share relative to that of i is independent of a change in their relative prices initiated 
by i.  When i and j are substitutes, non-zero values of Mij indicate that j’s share position relative 
to that of i is vulnerable to a change in their relative prices initiated by i.  When i and j are 
complements, non-zero values of M ij indicate that j’s share position relative to that of i is co-
dependent on changes in their relative prices initiated by i. 
 
  Table C1 presents the possible combinations of inelastic/elastic demand conditions and 
substitute/complement relationships as a 2 x 2 matrix.  Each of the four cells of Table C1 may 
be further split according to whether Mij is greater than or less than zero.  When a pair of media 
are price substitutes (upper half of Table C1), negative values of Mij denote strong substitutability 
in the sense that the magnitude of the cross-price elasticity exceeds the extent of inelasticity 
(elasticity), i.e., Eij > (1 + Eii).  Positive values of Mij indicate weak substitutability in the sense that 
the magnitude of the cross-price elasticity is less than the extent of inelasticity (elasticity), i.e., 
Eij < (1 + Eii).  Similarly, for media pairs that are complements (lower half of Table C1), the sign 
of Mij distinguishes instances of weak complementarity (Mij > 0) from those of strong 
complementarity (Mij < 0). 
*************** 
INSERT TABLE C1 HERE 
*****************  
  Morishima elasticities were estimated for each year of the 1961-1994 study period. Mean 
values and the corresponding mean ratios to their asymptotic standard errors are presented 
below in Table C2.  Table C1 summarizes how the incidence and magnitude of the mean values 
of the Morishima elasticities for the various media pairs vary across the combinations of own- 
and cross-price elasticity conditions defined by the six relevant cells of the table.  52
  Consider first the case of the substitutes in the upper half of Table C1.  That weak 
substitutability was more prevalent than strong substitutability is indicated by the positive 
mean Morishima elasticities for 18 of the 32 pairs.  Nine of the fourteen cases of strong 
substitutability (Mij < 0) accompanied inelastic demand, which was to be expected, newspapers 
being the only medium for which demand was elastic.11  (22 For each instance of strong 
substitutability, we tested the null hypothesis that Mij = 0 and found that for only seven of the 
fourteen Mij’s, could the latter hypothesis be rejected at the .05 level (one-tail test).  These seven 
cases of “significant strong substitutability” are listed below in Table C3. 
 
  Given that direct mail and newspapers are the two media that were predominantly 
substitutes, it is not surprising that direct mail was the source of influence or “clout” in three of 
the seven cases of significant strong substitution, newspapers played a similar role in the other 
two cases. 
 
  Table C3 also displays the value of the Morishima elasticity for the reciprocal 
relationship (Mji) for each of the seven cases of strong substitutability.  A reciprocal substitute 
relationship was designated as “independent” when the null hypothesis that Mji = 0 could not 
be rejected at the .05 level (one-tail test).  The resulting classification of the reciprocal Mji’s is 
presented in the last column of Table C3. 
 
  Contrasting the pairwise values of Mij and Mji underscores the asymmetry of intermedia 
competition.  For each of the seven cases, the reciprocal substitute relationship (Mji) appears 
substantially weaker (i.e., either “weak” or “independent”) than that of its strong counterpart 
(Mij).  Thus, the intermedia relationships identified in Table C3 are situations where one 
medium operates at a competitive advantage (disadvantage) relative to the other 
 
  It is apparent from the summary of the Morishima elasticities for cases in which media 
pairs are complements (lower half of Table C3) that the weak complementarity condition 
predominates (23 of 24 pairs of complements).  All but one of the complementary relationships 
involved inelastic demand.  That the market demand for only one of the eight media 
(newspapers) was elastic clearly restricted the possibilities for strong complementarities to be 
observed here. 
 
  Although it predominates over intermedia complementarity, intermedia substitutability 
tends to be weak as reflected in our analysis of the Morishima elasticities.  The few cases of 
strong substitutability that were observed, seem to be characterized by asymmetric 
competition, the media most often involved being direct mail and newspapers.  Weak 
complementarity was universally observed; no instances of significant strong complementarity 
appeared. 
 
                                                 
22 Quasi-concavity conditions on the advertising cost function (see equation (2) above) imply that Mij ≤ 1.  
For the complement/inelastic demand condition shown in Table C1, six of the 22 estimated Mij’s exceeded 
unity.  However, a one-tail test of the null hypothesis that Mij = 1 could be rejected in only two of the six 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table C2 
 
MEAN VALUE OF ESTIMATES OF ANNUAL MORISHIMA SHARE ELASTICITY OF A 
SUBSTITUTION, 1961-1994 
(Mean Ratio of Annual Elasticity to Annual Asymptotic Standard Error in Parentheses) 
  
M ij =
∂ln (Sj /S i
∂ln (Pj /P i
Pj fixed but Pi var ies (i ≠ j) 
 
  
Mij where j equals: 
 

























































































































































SIGNIFICANT STRONG SUBSTITUTE RELATIONS 
 







 Influence i 









Inelastic Demand for Medium (i)     
Network TV (i)  -- Magazine (j)  -0.44  +0.14  Independent 
Outdoor (i)  -- Network Radio (j)  -0.51  +0.17  Weak 
Direct Mail (i)  --Network TV (j)  -0.33  +0.004  Independent 
Direct Mail (i)  -- Newspaper (j)  -0.58  -0.27  Independent 
Direct Mail (i)  -- Outdoor (j)  -0.99  +0.54  Weak 
Elastic Demand for Medium (i)      
Newspaper (i)  -- Spot Radio (j)  -0.55  +0.56  Weak 





CLASSIFYING NATIONAL ADVERTISING MEDIA BY MARKET STRUCTURE AND THE 
SHORT-RUN ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY 
This appendix explains how the classification of media by market structure and short-
run elasticity of supply presented in Table 4 was developed. 
D.1  Short-Run Elasticity of Supply 
Given the absence of empirical studies of this quantity, we resorted to a simple 
dichotomous categorization of the media based upon judgmental estimates of how expandable 
the amount of space or time available to advertisers was in the short-term, say a quarter.  The 
short-run elasticity of broadcast media tends to be relatively low given that the numbers of 
stations and time slots are essentially fixed.  Similarly, the supply of outdoor advertising space 
cannot be quickly expanded in the near term because of the restricted availability of suitable 
locations.  In contrast, for print media, the elasticity of supply is comparatively greater since the 
amount of advertising space available within an issue or edition can be increased within a 
relatively short time frame. 
D.2  Market Structure 
We arrayed the eight media in Table 4 according to the levels of concentration 
prevailing in each category as indicated by published studies and evidence.*  The newspaper 
industry is generally characterized as monopolistic, with 90% of the United State’s 1,600 daily 
newspapers being the only papers published in their served markets and 85% of these papers 
owned by larger publishing or media firms (Picard 1993).  However, the percentage of the 
industry’s total revenue (circulation plus national and local advertising) accounted for by the 
four largest publishing firms was in 1995.  Since the division of newspaper company revenues 
into circulation and advertising sources is not usually divulged, the four firm concentration 
level was calculated using total company and industry revenues as reported by the American 
Newspaper Association and Advertising Age.  Network television remained a three-firm 
oligopoly for four decades until Fox formed a fourth network in 1990 (Owen and Wildman 
1992), followed by two additional entries in 1994. 
In contrast, radio networks are more numerous (72 were operating in 1995) and 
differentiated.  However, concentration in the network radio market is high and increasing.  As 
of 1996, the top three firms - ABC, CBS, and Westwood One - accounted for over 95% of 
network advertising revenues (ABC Network Radio Research).  Following the early 1997 
merger of Westwood and the CBS Radio Network, the industry will be a virtual duopoly.   
Overall, radio derives only about 20% of its advertising revenues from national (as opposed to 
local) advertisers.  Further, 80% of spending on radio by national advertisers is spot rather than 
national (McDonough 1995).  Spot radio markets are typically served by dozens of competing 
stations and, although the relaxation of regulations on multiple station ownership has been 
accompanied by an increase in concentration in recent years, the four largest ownership groups 
controlled only 12% of the industry’s total revenue in 1995 (Noam 1996).  Similarly, major spot 
television markets are generally served by several local television stations and the gradual 
                                                 
* See Gomery (1993) , Neuman (1991), and Picard (1989) for reviews of research on market structures in 
the media industries. Discussions of concentration levels in media industries typically rely on audience 
size and/or sales revenue as the relevant measure of size or output. Measures of the concentration of 
advertising volume and revenue have not been developed.  
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reduction of limits on nationwide ownership of stations has led to an increase in concentration 
over time.  By 1995, the four largest ownership groups accounted for about 25% of television 
station revenues in the United States (Noam 1996). 
A competitive market structure prevails in the national magazine advertising market, 
with 12 thousand titles being published.  The largest publishers are diversified media firms; the 
four leading magazine publishers accounted for 25.9% of all magazine revenues in 1995 
(Endicott 1996).  Data from the Census of Service Industries showed that in 1992 outdoor 
advertising services were supplied by approximately 1,300 firms and the four firm 
concentration ratio was 31.2%.  Direct mail services were available from almost 4,000 firms in 
1992, with a four firm concentration ratio of 19.1%. 
 
 
 
 